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“A science’s level of development is determined by the extent to which it 
is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts.”  Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a practicing lawyer in the year 1800 in a relatively developed American 
state such as Massachusetts.  A client asks the lawyer to defend him in a contract 
dispute and briefs him on the relevant facts.  He has a good feeling that his client will 
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be able to escape liability, but he wants to confirm this with some legal research.  
Unfortunately, he has no idea where to find a decent law library.  His own 
bookshelves are sparsely populated—he has an English edition of Blackstone (there 
won’t be an American edition until 18032) and some English reports, but not much 
else.  He inquires at the courthouse and finds that neither the local court nor the 
state’s highest court generates written reports of its opinions.3  Luckily, he is able to 
find cases addressing the relevant legal issues in the English reports, as well as some 
favorable passages in Blackstone.  Armed with this precedent, he is confident that his 
arguments will persuade the court and his client will prevail. 
The day of the trial arrives, and a jury is empanelled. He smiles smugly as 
plaintiff’s counsel makes legal arguments that are clearly contradicted by his 
prestigious authorities.  The trial nears its end and his smile fades as the court gives 
its instructions to the jury—not only has the judge not given his preferred instruction, 
but he has failed to instruct the jury at all on key points of law.4  The jury returns a 
verdict against his client.  He can only assume that this was due to an erroneous view 
of the relevant law, and therefore he advises his client to appeal—particularly since 
this jurisdiction does not provide any mechanism for the court to grant a new trial for 
a verdict against law.5  To his surprise, the appeal is essentially a retrial, presided 
over by a panel of justices, each of whom gives the jury his own interpretation of the 
applicable legal rules prior to deliberations.6  Worst of all, one of the justices 
concludes his instruction by reminding the jury to listen to their hearts and 
consciences and not to be unduly impressed by “lawyers’ law.”7  Everything our 
lawyer knows from Blackstone and the (admittedly sparse) available precedent tells 
him that his client should win, yet he loses again. 
Truly, this is a crushing defeat—but what could our turn-of-the-nineteenth-
century lawyer have done differently?  He was willing to learn the relevant law, but 
without reported cases or treatises, who could say what the law was?  And unsettling 
as that might be, even worse was the conduct of the judges; even if he could learn 
what the law was, how could he be certain it would apply in a given case when the 
                                                                
2
 The first American edition of Blackstone was edited by St. George Tucker, Professor of 
Law at the College of William and Mary, and published in 1803. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). 
3
 Official publication of judicial opinions did not begin in Massachusetts until the early 
1800s.  See William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 
339-42 (2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Province of the Judiciary]. 
4
 Judges in Massachusetts were not required to give instructions on all points of law in a 
case until 1808.  See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE 
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 168 (1975) 
[hereinafter NELSON, COMMON LAW]. 
5
 New trials for verdicts against law were not instituted in Massachusetts until 1805.  Id. at 
167. 
6
 A single statement of the law was not required until 1808.  See id. at 168. 
7
 This detail is based on the statement of a Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, 
who once instructed a jury that “[a] clear head and an honest heart are [worth] more than all 
the law of the lawyers.” Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the 
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 907 (1994). 
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court either did not instruct the jury on every rule, gave multiple versions of the same 
rule, or encouraged the jury to make up their own rule?  In light of this seemingly 
bizarre series of events, it is easy from our modern point of view to begin to doubt 
whether this society even has a system of law to speak of; it seems as though rules 
and rights are merely an unstable jumble of hard-to-discern custom and fluctuating 
popular opinion. 
This scenario, which combines a variety of actual practices common in early 
American legal practice, and the reaction it provokes in us as twenty-first-century 
observers, sheds light on our modern assumptions about what the law is, about the 
structure of legal discourse, about how we know and how we talk about “the law.”  It 
makes us conscious of our tendency to perceive a dichotomy between law on the one 
hand and mere opinion or politics on the other.  Our instinctive judgment that the 
opening scenario is an example of “lawlessness” is predicated on an unstated 
assumption about the law that raises the question: For us, what rules and concepts 
fall within the domain signified by the term “law,” as it is applied with governmental 
sanction, with courts being the paradigmatic case?8  A reasonably astute twenty-first-
century student or practitioner of law might answer that the domain of the law is 
comprised of constitutions, statutory codes, previously decided cases, administrative 
and possibly secondary sources such as treatises or Restatements, and that the law 
applicable to any particular case is the specific set of rules drawn from this domain 
and deemed applicable to the case by a judicial authority. 
This answer, while perhaps not perfect, is reasonably accurate for most practical 
purposes in describing the contours of what counts as “the law” in the United States 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  Furthermore, it contains within it a basic 
outline of the way our normal legal discourse9 is structured.  The law is a domain 
comprised of a relatively stable and predictable body of authoritative legal materials 
that are the source of concepts and norms that may be called our (official) legal 
vocabulary.  From this vocabulary, statements with the force of authority can be (and 
are) made by certain privileged speakers who are set apart from the population as a 
whole by a recognized, regularized process of initiation—a legal education for 
lawyers generally, and for judges, an additional sanction in the form of appointment 
(mainly) or election.  We can also identify two categories of statements that are not 
“legal” statements because they are not made within this discursive structure: 
statements that contain vocabulary not drawn from the conceptual domain of 
authoritative legal materials and statements whose maker is not a recognized, 
privileged speaker in the sense I have just described.   
Such statements certainly are capable of resonance in society, but they are not 
part of what we can call (borrowing from Wittgenstein10) the “language game” of the 
                                                                
8
 This clarification is intended to leave less formal (though certainly not always less 
significant) bodies of rules, such as those embodied in religion or informal norms governing 
social situations, beyond the scope of the question. 
9
 I use the term “normal legal discourse” in the same sense that Thomas Kuhn used the 
term “normal science” in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions to denote discourse and 
argumentation wholly within the conventional legal paradigm of our day.  THOMAS KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23-34 (3d ed. 1996). 
10
 See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 5 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., Blackwell 3d ed. 1967) (1958) (“I shall . . . call the whole, consisting of language and 
the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game.’”). 
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law in that they are not cognizable within our legal regime.  Our ideas about who is 
recognized as having authority to speak and what conceptual vocabulary they can 
use are like the rules of any game and have real-world effects, dictating the shape of 
the field of play, who can play, and what moves the players can make.  Just as the 
game of football denies recognition to plays made by disqualified players, that take 
place out of bounds, or that violate any number of rules only a seasoned fan can 
appreciate and understand, our legal regime rigidly and in great detail prescribes 
what players and what moves can succeed in the arena of the courtroom.   
As our bemused nineteenth-century protagonist’s experience suggests, and this 
paper will more fully demonstrate, the discursive structure of the legal “language 
game” in early American practice was not characterized by the sort of rigidity we 
take for granted today.  The sources of law were less clear; although some 
authoritative materials, like Blackstone’s Commentaries, existed, no one book or set 
of books could be considered definitively to state the law that would govern in a 
given case.  Similarly, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, the rules 
regarding who could speak were less rigid—at least within the population of white 
males.  Not all judges were lawyers.  Not all lawyers had much training.  And neither 
judges nor lawyers could effectively dictate the effective law—the law as it would be 
applied in any given case—because lay juries had the power, and a recognized right, 
to decide questions of law in accordance with their own consciences and 
understandings.   
Despite all of this indeterminacy, it is wrong to say that early America was 
somehow a lawless society.  What history confronts us with is rather an example of 
an alternate mode of legality, a different understanding of law that was perfectly 
valid in its time and cultural context.  Central to that understanding of the law was 
the jury as decider of law, an institutional arrangement in which lay people were 
inextricably intermeshed with the making and interpretation of law as it became 
effective through application to specific cases.  Yet within the first few decades of 
the nineteenth century, the jury’s law-finding powers were curtailed, and the layman 
juror was marginalized as a participant in legal discourse.  This change reflected a 
dramatic shift in American legal ideology the effects of which, at least in the case of 
the jury, remain with us today.  Therefore, the jury is the focus of this paper for two 
reasons: first, because it provides a window into a dramatically different 
understanding of the law that was operative in early America; and second, because 
studying the demise of the jury as finder of law provides insight into the ideological 
revolution that gave rise to many enduring concepts and practices that remain part of 
our legal system today.  The analysis of the law-finding jury and its demise that 
follows demonstrates the historical contingency of our current jury system—
specifically the relegation of the jury to deciding issues of fact—as well as the 
possibility for contemporary society of greater popular influence in determining the 
law that is applied in courts.  
The approach I have taken in this paper looks to history both to demonstrate the 
contingency of currently-dominant practices and ideologies and to suggest the 
existence of alternatives for contemporary society.  In this respect, it builds on recent 
constitutional law scholarship dealing with the concept of “popular 
constitutionalism,” perhaps best exemplified by Larry Kramer’s The People 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/6
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Themselves11 and the critical responses it has inspired.12   Kramer and others have 
problematized the relatively rigid discursive structure of constitutional law in the age 
of judicial supremacy by historicizing it, showing its historical contingency.  Kramer 
posits a not particularly distant American past in which “the people themselves,” as 
well as courts, judges, and lawyers were recognized as legitimate enunciators and 
interpreters of constitutional law.13  Kramer and others have argued that it may be 
desirable to revive a regime of popular constitutionalism in the present, expanding 
the field of possible makers of legitimate arguments about what the Constitution 
means, and presumably expanding the conceptual vocabulary in which those 
arguments would be stated.14   
This paper seeks to take the spirit of the work of Kramer and others beyond the 
rarified context of constitutional law and into the realm of the everyday.  The 
existing literature, being focused primarily on constitutional law, has not sufficiently 
appreciated either the breadth of lay involvement in non-constitutional criminal and 
civil law in early America, or the fact that the historical movements to establish 
judicial supremacy had parallels—more successful parallels—in the realm of non-
constitutional law.  Examining the law-finding jury and its demise provides an 
insight into this broader context.  Furthermore, the existing literature raises questions 
about the possibility of constitutional law being generated and shaped by non-
lawyers.15  We must recognize the received view of law as a scientific or scholarly 
discourse that underlies the separation of powers between judge and jury that we take 
for granted is an artifact of nineteenth-century conflicts shaped by ideological 
commitments and economic interests that continue to have a material impact on 
society today.  This paper argues that the current relegation of the jury to a fact-
finding role is the product of an untenable nineteenth-century legal ideology of law 
                                                                
11
 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
12
 In addition to being widely reviewed in numerous law reviews and the mainstream 
press, the book was also the subject of a symposium held at the Chicago-Kent College of Law 
in November, 2005.  The papers and commentaries resulting from that symposium were 
subsequently collected and published by the Chicago-Kent Law Review.  See Symposium, A 
Symposium on the People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809 (2006). 
13
 See KRAMER, supra note 11, at 207-26 (arguing that the ideal of popular interpretation 
of the Constitution was not only part of the colonial and early American legal landscape, but 
that it remained viable and influential through the New Deal era). 
14
 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 11, at 233; Robin West, Katrina, The Constitution, and 
the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1163-72 (2006) (arguing for the 
development of a new paradigm of legislative constitutionalism in order to more fully realize 
the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
15
 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1594 (2005) (stating that Kramer’s challenge to judicial supremacy 
“inspire[s] dread and make[s] the blood run cold,” and arguing that “popular constitutionalism 
is about as unattractive as a constitutional theory could possibly be”); Neal Devins, Tom 
DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (2005) (arguing that today’s 
polarized, partisan Congress is unlikely to realize the objectives of Kramer’s popular 
constitutionalism). 
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as science and suggests that important societal values may be served by a revival of 
the jury as finder of law, such that the jury’s role deserves at least to be the subject of 
serious and honest debate.  Ultimately, we must interrogate our commitment to a 
discursive regime that relegates the ordinary citizen, in his or her capacity as juror, to 
a bystander in the development and articulation of legal norms in the courtroom.      
This paper proceeds in two parts.  The first part is devoted to an historical 
argument that juries in early American legal systems possessed a broad power to 
decide questions of law, which corresponded to a conception of the law as emerging 
from, and intimately bound up with, the experiences and beliefs of the members of a 
given community—a power that was taken from them in a relatively short period of 
time due to a variety of social pressures, none of which would have been sufficient to 
cause the change absent the emergence of a new ideology of law as an apolitical 
science.  The second part moves to the present day and argues that, given the 
untenability of the view of law as science upon which the now-conventional division 
of powers between judge and jury depends, the current system must find new 
justification or be abandoned.  I do not take a position on the desirability of keeping 
or abandoning the conventional system, but I suggest several ways in which the 
necessary debate over continuation of the current division of powers between judge 
and jury necessitates a reevaluation of concepts fundamental to our conventional 
mode of thinking about the law, legal reasoning, and the interests implicated by the 
way in which jury trials are conducted. 
I. 
Christine Desan, in her exploration of legislative adjudication in colonial 
America, writes of the historical “ghosts that haunt the early Republic . . . disparate 
phenomena that today seem meaningless or discordant” but which were in fact 
integral in their time to the experience of government.16  These phenomena become 
“ghosts” when later traditions, viewing history through their own lenses, analyze the 
past seeking comfort or justification in continuity with historical norms.17  The 
practice of juries deciding law in the early Republic is such a ghost.  Although it is a 
less obscure phenomenon than legislative adjudication, it so violates one of the most 
basic, universal, and uncontroversial tenets of our current legal tradition—that juries 
determine questions of fact and judges decide questions of law—that the tendency is 
to talk about it, if at all, as an aberration or imperfection rather than as an important 
expression of the way those for whom it was a lived reality understood the law.   
To view the early American practice of jury-made law in this anachronistic way 
does us a double disservice.18  First, we misunderstand (or even render incoherent) 
the concept of law as it was experienced in that era by attempting to make it fit into 
our current conceptual vocabulary.  Second, by rendering illegible what came before, 
we efface the historical process through which our current understandings and 
commitments were created, obscuring the historical contingency of the current order 
and cloaking it with a false appearance of inevitability.  Therefore, it is important to 
attempt to describe—while striving not to import our present conceptual vocabulary 
                                                                
16
 Christine Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the 
Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1998). 
17
 Id. at 1385. 
18
 My conceptual framework here is borrowed largely from Desan.  See id. at 1384-89. 
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or to construct attractive but misleading continuities—the jury as a law-deciding and 
law-making institution in early America, and also the process by which this practice 
was curtailed and the legal landscape transformed into something more closely 
resembling the system we take for granted today.  I argue that the transition from a 
system in which juries had control over issues of both fact and law to one where 
judges exercised strong control over the law applied in every case hinged upon the 
ascendance of a new concept of the law as a rational legal science.  Commentators 
have advanced several explanations of what caused the marginalization of the jury’s 
law-finding power, yet I argue that none of these causes could have produced the 
change without a change in the underlying concept of the law. 
This section begins by briefly describing the practice of juries deciding issues of 
law, both criminal and civil, in the early Republic and draws some conclusions about 
the concept of law that underwrote that mode of legality.  The next part of this 
section describes the demise of juries as deciders of law in the early to mid-
nineteenth-century and discusses other commentators’ explanations of this dramatic 
shift.  The final part describes an emerging concept of law as a rational, apolitical 
legal science that was embraced by important elites and argues that it provided the 
linchpin for the marginalization of the jury as decider of law.  Specifically, I argue 
that this emerging concept of law—which has been discussed thoroughly in other 
contexts—changed not only the substance of the law, but also the structure of legal 
discourse, delegitimizing the lay jury as a source of true or accurate statements about 
the law. 
A.  Juries as Deciders of Law in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries 
During the colonial period, and continuing through the Revolution and 
ratification into the early nineteenth century, American legal thought was 
characterized by a “strong conviction that juries were the ultimate judges of law and 
fact.”19  Unlike their English counterparts,20  American juries around the turn of the 
nineteenth century had not only the power, but a recognized right, to decide cases in 
accordance with their own views of the appropriate law to be applied.21  It must be 
emphasized that unlike today’s juries, whose power to covertly refuse to apply the 
law to a given case (often termed “jury nullification”) is admitted by judges and 
academics but almost universally considered highly problematic if not simply 
illegitimate,22 the early American jury’s right to make final determinations of law 
was “frequently confirmed by constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions.”23 
                                                                
19
 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 28 
(1977) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION]. 
20
 While English juries were protected from overt coercion or punishment by judges, the 
legal establishment never acknowledged their right to decide questions of law.  See Alschuler 
& Deiss, supra note 7, at 903. 
21
 Id.  
22
 See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 
877-8 (1999) (describing concern with and criticism of jury nullification in the press, 
academy, judiciary, and legislature). 
23
 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 903.  
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 The scope of the jury’s power to decide law was broad.  Although most 
commentary has focused on criminal juries as finders of law, the power extended to 
civil cases as well; some of the earliest examples of American juries exercising a 
“nullifying” power are found in civil cases.24  Furthermore, there were few 
limitations on the jury’s law-finding power.  Judicial control over the law of a given 
case was minimal.  In the colonial era, and continuing into the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, it was common for judges to be laymen without any formal 
training in the law, even at the appellate court level.25  Consequently, the many lay 
judges would have had significant difficulty making and justifying a determination 
that a jury had gotten the law wrong in a given case.  Even in relatively sophisticated 
legal communities like the one in Massachusetts, where the judiciary was more likely 
to have formal training, the structural and procedural means to control a jury’s 
application of law were absent at the turn of the nineteenth century.  Traditionally in 
Massachusetts, a panel of Supreme Court justices would each render a separate 
opinion on the law of the case; not until 1805 was this streamlined into trial before a 
single judge, meaning that there would be a single legal standard articulated by the 
court.26  Only three years later, Massachusetts judges were required to give 
instructions on each point of law in a case, and only two years after that did the 
granting of a new trial for a verdict against the law become commonplace.27  Even 
this limitation on the power of the jury can be seen as a sign of the jury’s strength—
as Renee B. Lettow has argued, the granting of a new trial for a verdict against law 
succeeded as a means of controlling juries precisely because it was less offensive to 
the popular understanding that juries were ultimate interpreters of law as well as 
fact.28 
The absence of institutional controls over the jury illustrates the power of the jury 
to decide questions of law.  That its right to do so was an integral part of the early 
American legal mentality is illustrated by legislative enactments (such as the 1808 
Massachusetts statute affirming the law-finding power of the jury in criminal cases29) 
and state constitutional conventions (the 1820 Massachusetts convention rejected a 
proposal to officially designate jurors as the judges of law and fact as unnecessarily 
stating the obvious,30 while one delegate to the 1821 New York constitutional 
convention denied that the governor needed a veto, since judges and juries would use 
                                                                
24
 See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1605 (2001).  See also 
Matthew P. Harrington, The Law Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
377, 389-90 (1999) (discussing eighteenth-century civil cases in Pennsylvania).  
25
 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 905. 
26
 NELSON, COMMON LAW, supra note 4, at 167. 
27
 Id. at 168.  
28
 Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early 
Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 526 (1996) (arguing that new trial, 
rather than other mechanisms, succeeded as a method for controlling juries “by virtue of its 
appearance of retaining jury authority”). 
29
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their law-finding powers to neutralize unconstitutional laws31).  Furthermore, the 
pronouncements of prominent jurists—even Federalists such as John Jay and John 
Marshall—acknowledged the right of the jury to make its own determinations on 
questions of law, notwithstanding the instructions of judges to the contrary.  In 1794, 
Justice Jay instructed jurors in a Supreme Court jury trial that, although judges were 
presumed to be the best judges of legal questions and juries of factual questions, 
“you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to 
determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.”32    In 1807, even as the power 
of the jury was beginning to erode in cutting-edge jurisdictions like Massachusetts, 
Justice Marshall instructed the jury in Aaron Burr’s treason trial that, while they had 
“heard the opinion of the court on the law of the case,” they were ultimately to “find 
a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may direct.”33  
In attempting to understand the law-finding jury on its own terms, we need to 
ask: What concept of law did this institutional arrangement reflect?  In other words, 
what did the law need to be in order for it to be reasonable to assert that jurors—
average male members of the community without any special legal qualifications—
could articulate it in a way that would be conclusive for the parties in civil and 
criminal cases?  Any attempt to characterize the concept of law that made the law-
finding jury possible is hampered by the fact that the jury, composed of a rotating 
cast of anonymous citizens that expressed themselves in verdicts rather than 
opinions, treatises, or public pronouncements, was an institution that would not have 
articulated an explanation or justification of itself.   
Therefore, we must fall back on inferences that can be drawn from the 
institutional structure of the jury and the courts, operating under the assumption that 
this structure was not an accident, but an embodiment of a given community’s 
commonly-held ideas about the law.  Proceeding in this way, a few conclusions seem 
clear.  First, the law was not a body of knowledge to which lawyers and judges had 
exclusive or even privileged access, for notwithstanding the instructions of judges or 
the arguments of lawyers, the law did not become effective (in the sense that it 
would have a binding effect upon the parties to a case) until ratified by the jury 
through its verdict.  The collective wisdom, the set of norms and experiences that 
could draw a consensus of the (white male) community, voiced through its proxy the 
jury, were the decisive source of the law that would be applied to members of the 
community in the courts.34 
This hierarchy suggests something further about the concept of law that was 
operative in the era of the law-finding jury: it reflected a legal epistemology (in the 
sense of an idea about how one could know about the law) in which book learning 
and formal training were valued, but membership in the ethical community of a 
                                                                
31
 See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 269 
(2005). 
32
 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794). 
33
 Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 67 (1895). 
34
 See NELSON, COMMON LAW, supra note 4, at 4 (“In a legal system in which juries have 
the power to find the law, whatever disputes arise cannot be resolved by mere majoritarian fiat 
but must be resolved by a process of consensus building that produces legal rules acceptable to 
a broad base of society as a whole.”). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
562 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:553 
relevant jurisdiction was the crucial requirement for a “true” understanding of the 
law.35  This assertion finds support in contemporary statements about the law.  In a 
diary entry that predates the Revolution, John Adams wrote that the “general Rules 
of Law and common Regulations of Society” were “well enough known to ordinary 
Jurors,” while the “Great Principles of the Constitution” were even more an innate 
part of every Briton, such that “it is scarcely extravagant to say, they are drawn in 
and imbibed with the Nurses Milk and first Air.”36   From the opposite end of the 
social spectrum, a farmer who served on the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
instructed jurors that “[a] clear head and an honest heart are [worth] more than all the 
law of the lawyers.”37  In these quotations, the law is something organic that 
becomes part of the community member by virtue of his membership, his having 
been formed by the community, and which he reproduces in the community by his 
service as a juror.38 
Certainly, the underlying concept of law in the era of the law-finding jury was 
too complex to be reduced to a few simple axioms.  The New Hampshire farmer-
justice’s quote can also be read as a manifestation of what Perry Miller characterized 
as a late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American “legal pietism” that was 
suspicious of the sophisticated arguments, rhetoric, and foreign precedent of learned 
law, regarding it as an undesirable import in a country whose “native genius” lay in 
its “natural, reasonable and equitable” character.39  But even accepting the religious 
and nationalistic dimensions that Miller’s description adds, the core understanding of 
the law as an organic body of ideals that are definitively known by and through the 
community speaking through its proxy the jury remains intact, as does the notion of 
the courtroom, and the jury box specifically, as a site where the law of lawyers and 
judges had to justify itself before the legal mind of the jury, seeking the 
legitimization it needed to be effective as law.  The jury box, then, was also a space 
of choice, and therefore of ethical agency, for the individual juror who became, like 
Shelley’s poet, an unacknowledged legislator, at least within the world of a single 
case. 
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 See id. at 3-4.  Nelson says that “[t]he fact that juries rather than judges regularly 
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B.  The Demise of the Law-Finding Jury 
By the 1830s, the procedure of granting a new trial for a verdict against law was 
widespread.40  Similarly, procedural and structural changes that began in the first 
years of the nineteenth century in places such as Massachusetts,41 and that provided a 
structural basis for strong judicial control over the law that juries applied—such as 
requiring a single statement from the court on each point of law, and creating a more 
“modern” appellate court system with almost exclusively appellate jurisdiction—had 
spread to states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Tennessee, and North Carolina.42  And 
while the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1895 opinion in Sparf v. United States43 is often 
cited today as establishing the present division of labor between judge and jury as a 
matter of federal constitutional law, the Court’s position in Sparf was already 
anticipated 60 years earlier by Justice Story in United States v. Battiste:44  
[In each civil and criminal case involving a general verdict, the jurors] 
must necessarily determine the law, as well as the fact.  In each, they have 
the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the court.  
But I deny that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to 
decide the law according to their own notions, or pleasure.  On the 
contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party . . . 
that the jury should respond to the facts, and the court as to the law.  It is 
the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of 
the jury to follow the law. . . .45 
The right of juries to decide the law of the case had been transformed into a duty and 
a moral obligation to apply the law as given by the court; to do otherwise was not 
merely an affront to the power of the court but a violation of the “most sacred 
constitutional right” of  the parties to the case.   
In a period of no more than forty years, a dramatic shift in the role and power of 
the American jury had occurred.  The question of the causes of this shift has been 
addressed in previous legal scholarship, but because the history of the jury has not 
been a central part of most commentaries, explanations have tended to be somewhat 
cursory.  It is not essential for the purposes of this paper that there be a single 
explanation; what I hope to show is that the changed nature of the jury as an 
institution that emerged by the 1830s was a reflection of a new ideology of the law 
that served as a linchpin without which none of the more concrete causes that 
commentators have suggested could have been sufficient.  At this point, it makes 
sense to review the existing literature discussing the decline of the law-finding jury 
before proceeding to argue that the jury’s decline would not have been possible 
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absent a new concept of the law that undermined the theoretical foundation of the 
law-finding jury as an institution of the American legal system. 
One version of the events suggests that America, at the time of the Revolution, 
was a relatively simple society that became more complex in the decades following 
ratification, leading to a need for more complex legal rules precisely at a time when 
the “real law” of judges and lawyers became increasingly available through 
published legal materials and an expansion of legal education.46  Yet, even granting 
its factual premises about increased complexity and greater availability of legal 
materials, this explanation begs the crucial question: When and why did the 
preference for “real” learned law of judges and lawyers dominate over the organic 
law of the jury?  We have seen that the legal ideology underlying the law-finding 
jury was not unaware of learned law; the law of the jury was not merely a 
placeholder for a more desirable but inaccessible law.  Therefore, the crucial 
question, which this explanation cannot begin to answer, is how “real” learned law 
became not simply preferred, but exclusively legitimate in the dominant American 
legal ideology. 
A somewhat more persuasive explanation focuses on the transition from the 
colonial experience of a legal system that was ultimately controlled by a non-
representative, unaccountable monarchy to the post-Revolutionary order in which 
government was accountable and laws were made by elected representatives.47  
William E. Nelson has argued that the establishment of a representative government 
brought about a change in public opinion regarding the legitimacy of the jury as a 
forum for popular legal expression: once the legislature became the representative 
body par excellence, the jury’s independence became both less necessary and less 
legitimate, as it tended to undermine the power of republican government.48 
In criticizing this theory, Larry Kramer argues that there is relatively little 
evidence that the jury came to be viewed as inconsistent with a republican form of 
government.49  Kramer also notes that the vast majority of civil cases (where the jury 
lost its law-finding power first) continued to be based on the common law rather than 
statutes enacted by represented legislatures, suggesting that the risk of a jury 
supplanting legislative enactments with its own rules was minimal.50  Most 
importantly, explaining the decline of the law-finding power of the jury in terms of a 
desire to remove impediments to the implementation of the laws and policies of a 
democratically-elected legislature can hardly explain the simultaneous expansion of 
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 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 7, at 917.  See also Douglas G. Smith, The Historical 
and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 445 (1996) (“[I]t is not 
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the power of judges, who grew over this same period from the “automatons”51 of the 
colonial period into influential leaders of American thought and shapers of law, such 
as Marshall, Kent, and Story.  In a legal world where the vast majority of cases are 
decided on common-law principles, disempowering the jury elevates the judge, not 
the legislature, and does not reflect an ideology founded on the primacy of 
democratically-created positive law.  Therefore, a concern with protecting the 
supremacy of democratically-legislated law cannot explain a shift in which the jury 
lost its law-finding power in all cases, including those at common law, and the power 
of judges—the classic anti-majoritarian actors—increased. 
The increase in the power of judges is consistent, however, within another trend 
in the first decades following the ratification of the federal Constitution, which seems 
to be the converse of the pro-legislature sentiment Nelson has advanced as an 
explanation for the decline in the jury’s power: a growing mistrust of the arbitrary, 
unwise, or even tyrannical will of democratic majorities that caused some to look to 
the courts as a bulwark against what James Kent termed “the encroachments and 
tyranny of faction.”52  It is important to note that the concern with one’s will was not 
introduced into the American legal-political environment by the Federalists after 
independence; in fact, it seems to represent a transvaluation of a preexisting colonial 
preoccupation with will—not the will of the unwashed masses, but the will (or 
discretion) of the unaccountable judge.53  Indeed, as Nelson has explained, in 
colonial Massachusetts, “the jury was viewed as a means of controlling judges’ 
discretion and restraining their possible arbitrary tendencies.”54  
Traumatic post-ratification experiences with expressions of popular will—
ranging from redistributive legislation and laws like debtors’ relief acts that clearly 
advanced the interests of one class to the detriment of another, to non-legislative 
popular mobilizations like the Whiskey Rebellion and less-threatening but still-
troubling manifestations such as ill-advised public improvement projects55—
convinced some that the popular will was no more reasonable, no less arbitrary, than 
that of a despotic monarch.  The equation of the tyrannical majority with a tyrannical 
monarch is expressed in Kent’s justification of a strong judiciary under either 
monarchy or republicanism: “In monarchical governments, the independence of the 
judiciary is essential to guard the rights of the subject from the injustice of the 
crown; but in republics it is equally salutary in protecting the constitution and laws 
from the encroachments and tyranny of faction.”56  Even for those who were more 
favorably disposed toward the public at large, the actual experience of popular 
government in the early Republic must have shattered the notion that the community 
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shared a single, organic, stable conception of the law; the “ethical unity” of the 
populace (or at a minimum, the belief therein) was shredded in the first decades after 
the ratification.57 
The faith in a popularly-produced legality that underwrote the jury’s right to find 
law, as discussed in section I.A above, reflected a faith that a jury could check 
potentially-arbitrary discretionary decisions by judges because the jury was 
composed of members of an ethical community bound by a stable set of values and 
ideas about the law, such that an authentic consensus could be reached that would be 
stable over time.  For many, this belief became untenable in light of the actual 
experiences of popular self-government, and the polarity of the old dichotomy 
between judge and jury was reversed.58  But just as the old order had depended on 
the belief that communal values would give consistency to the legal determinations 
of juries and curb the discretion or will of judges, the new order needed an 
understanding of the law and judges’ relationship to the law such that the outcomes 
of legal decision-making would not be the mere will of the judges.59  In other words, 
the shift away from jury-dominated legality needed support from an alternative 
conception of the law that had theretofore not existed.   
Therefore, although a growing mistrust of the public generally, and of juries 
specifically, might explain the motivation behind the curtailment of the American 
jury’s right to find law, it does not explain the conceptual and rhetorical mechanisms 
that allowed an alternative system to emerge.  It explains the “why” but not the 
“how” of the transformation of the balance of power in the early-nineteenth-century 
American courtroom.  Attempting to answer the latter question, Morton Horwitz 
(and more recently Larry Kramer) advanced what I will call an “interest-based” 
explanation: the power of the jury was curtailed by an alliance of merchants (who 
wanted a commercial law that was both more predictable and substantively more 
aligned with business interests), bench, and bar (whose interests were aligned with 
the merchants for business reasons and who saw the subjugation of the jury as 
necessary to advance the position of the legal profession).60  The interest-based 
argument is persuasive as far as it goes, but like the anti-popular Federalist reaction, 
it stops short of identifying and explaining how the transformation of the American 
jury was accomplished, and from what concept of law it drew support. 
The purpose of this survey of the historiography on the demise of the law-finding 
jury in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has been to illustrate that 
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even the best, most persuasive accounts of this transformation, which produced the 
present balance of powers between judge and jury, have a significant lacuna where 
we would expect to find an analysis of the ideological transformation in American 
legal thought that would have been necessary to justify and sustain the new order in 
the American courtroom.  In the next part of this article, I address this ideological 
transformation in an attempt to uncover the emergent philosophical understanding of 
the law that made the transformation of the role of the jury possible—giving us the 
jury as we know it today. 
C.  Creating an Alternative Tradition: The Birth of American Legal Science 
A new institutional reality, in which judges would become supreme in the 
interpretation of the law and the selection of legal rules to govern specific cases, 
would require a concept of law whose internal logic justifies the centralization of 
law-deciding power in the bench.  Judge-made law needed to be consistent across 
cases, predictable ex ante, and to at least appear insulated from the vicissitudes of 
politics and arbitrary individual will.  In the 1790s, such a system did not exist.  As 
Chancellor Kent famously wrote of the state of the law when he joined the New 
York Supreme Court in 1798, “there were no reports or State precedents. The 
opinions from the Bench were delivered ore tenus.  We had no law of our own, and 
nobody knew what [the law] was.”61 
Kent’s hyperbolic statement must not be accepted uncritically, for as we have 
already seen, the state of affairs prior to 1798 was not anarchy—there was a legal 
system operating and deciding cases.  New York, like other colonies that had become 
states, had “a law of its own,” and somebody (on the one hand, the rotating cast of 
jurors; on the other, formally trained authorities like Kent) “knew” what it was, or at 
least intuited it.  But Kent’s statement rings true within the conceptual framework of 
his ideology of the law, which would become, through his efforts and those of like-
minded giants of early American law, the dominant paradigm of American thinking 
about the law by the 1820s and 1830s.  In this view, “the law” signified not an 
ephemeral product of consensus among jurors, lasting until the next case arose and 
the next jury was empanelled, but a stable body of doctrines belonging to a legal 
science that could be relied on to yield rules of decision across cases and time.  That 
kind of law was truly not in existence in the 1790s, nor was there a reliable system 
for discovering what it might be. 
Understood in this way, Kent’s statement can be translated: there was no stable 
body of legal principles that existed apart from their application in a specific case, 
and there was no reliable methodology for determining the specific content of this 
ephemeral body of principles.  The circular, nonsensical quality of this translation 
illustrates that the new ideology of law developed by Kent and others was a total 
system that contained a substantive idea about the law and a methodological idea 
about how the law could be known that were mutually reinforcing—the method of 
discovering the law defined its substance as much as the substantive idea of the law 
determined the appropriate way to know it.  Therefore, while this process of creating 
a new American legal ideology is sometimes described as “professionalization,”62 
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this description tends to efface the extent of the change it entailed.  It was not simply 
a matter of professionalizing a field of activity that had previously been left to 
laymen, but of creating a new field of activity, a new discourse—Law with a capital 
“L”—that was structured in such way that only professionals could fully participate 
in it. 
1.  The Blackstonian Influence 
The founding fathers of American legal science—first and foremost Kent and 
Story in the early decades of the nineteenth century—were deeply indebted to 
William Blackstone and his Commentaries.  Blackstone was not the originator of 
English legal science.  Rather, he participated in a tradition that dated back to the 
seventeenth-century writings of Coke and the work of Matthew Hale earlier in the 
eighteenth century, who had developed a method of legal analysis and synthesis 
based on the model of Enlightenment philosophy and the natural sciences.63  But it 
was Blackstone who first made explicit law’s claim to be a free-standing science 
with its own internal logic,64 arguing for the necessity of academic study to discover 
the structures and principles inherent in the law that could easily be overlooked by 
those who viewed the law merely as a means to an end.  Only by academic study 
aimed at an understanding of the deep structure of the law could the law’s internal 
consistency be understood.  Thus, Blackstone wrote of the student of law in the 
introduction to his Commentaries:  
[I]f practice be the whole he is taught, practice must also be the whole he 
will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the elements and first principles 
upon which the rule of practice is founded . . . he must never aspire to 
form, and seldom expect to comprehend, any arguments drawn a priori, 
from the spirit of the laws and the natural foundations of justice.65 
Blackstone’s goal was to understand the whole of the law—its fundamental 
structures and principles.66  His method was to identify the law’s component parts 
and to demonstrate how they related to each other and to the whole to form a 
logically and morally consistent system.67  On an even more fundamental level, his 
epistemology of the law—his way of knowing—was to engage in a systematic 
analysis of written decisions, statutes, and rules and derive from these a body of 
principles that was greater than the sum of its parts, a “meta-law that was embodied 
in the law itself.”68  For Blackstone, custom—expressed in and distilled from the 
individual data of cases and the like—had authority because it represented a 
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collective historical wisdom that at bottom was organized around the principle of 
protecting a specifically English conception of liberty.69 
Blackstone’s influence on Americans educated in the law in the second half of 
the eighteenth century was immense; he was as popular in the colonies as he was in 
England itself.70  After the revolution, however, the American legal establishment’s 
relationship to Blackstone was complicated by several factors.  First, as the battles 
over the “reception” of the common law illustrate, independence made it impossible 
to uncritically accept English law as operating within the states.  On a deeper level, 
Blackstone’s commitment to custom as authority deeply identified him with the 
English political and historical experience, including the monarchy against which the 
states had just rebelled, causing many to question his relevance to the new republic.71  
While the Commentaries, as edited and commented upon by St. George Tucker in 
1803, remained a standard text for Americans studying law in the nineteenth century, 
Tucker’s edition expressed the tension in the relationship between American law and 
Blackstone.  Tucker’s Commentaries denied that English custom had binding force 
in American common law and specifically highlighted aspects of Blackstone’s work 
that were inapplicable in America either because they were inconsistent with the 
material conditions of American society or because they were politically 
incompatible with its republican structure.72 
Beyond this tension, America at the turn of the nineteenth century was not an 
environment within which a Blackstonian legal science could operate.  As we have 
seen, the very phenomena that provided fundamental data in Blackstone’s 
epistemology of the law—reasoned, written decisions—were absent, as was the 
concept of the law as a single, overarching system of stable principles and rules.  For 
those who wanted to effect a fundamental change in the American legal system 
toward a more stable, predictable, and uniform body of learned law—in short, a 
“Blackstonian” system—the crucial step was to create the conditions that made such 
a system possible.    
2.  Creating the Data of an American Legal Science 
Legal science on the Blackstonian model drew conclusions about the 
fundamental principles that form the internal structure or morality of the legal system 
as a whole by engaging in an objective examination (modeled on the natural 
sciences)73 of empirical data in the form of reported decisions and other written legal 
materials that described the phenomena of the law.  This was the epistemological 
idea about the law that Blackstone bequeathed to the American legal elite, and that 
gave sense to Kent’s statement that “we had no law of our own, and no one knew 
what it was.”74  Law as a phenomenon was happening everywhere yet escaping study 
and systematization because there was no mechanism in place to create data about it.   
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Beginning in the first years of the nineteenth century, the American legal elite, 
led (of course) by Kent would self-consciously create the kind of data about the law 
that was critical to a scientific epistemology of the law.  Kent, as a member of the 
New York Supreme Court, began by determining to write an opinion in every case 
reserved for decision that would rely not only on the arguments of counsel but on his 
own research into all applicable law.75  He then ensured that his opinions would be 
published accurately and circulated among the New York legal community.76  
Similar efforts were undertaken by Theodore Sedgwick in Massachusetts, and 
publication of opinions was occurring in Pennsylvania by 1806.77  These steps were 
accompanied by institutional reforms of the courts in many states, such as requiring a 
single written statement addressing all points of law in each case, and the creation of 
appellate courts primarily dedicated to reviewing cases to correct error and maintain 
doctrinal consistency.78 
The importance of these initiatives was fundamental: American law, which had 
once been an ephemeral phenomenon, was undergoing a process of reification 
through which, for the first time in its history, was taking on an existence apart from 
its instantiation in given cases.   American law previously was whatever set of 
principles could gain the consensus of twelve men in a given locality; that law 
remained, for a time, but was now confronted with another possibility—a body of 
legal data that had independent existence in the written, reasoned opinions of the 
courts of a growing number of states.  This made possible a legal epistemology of 
the Blackstonian kind.  The consensus of the community, acting through its proxy 
the jury, no longer had a monopoly over the power to validate statements about what 
the law was; the data of recorded case law could prove or disprove, support or 
undermine claims about the law.  In short, the emergence of reported case law in the 
early nineteenth century made possible a new discourse about the law with new 
modes of truth and falsehood. 
The new discourse about the law was made possible by the creation of a body of 
American legal precedent.  This led to the elaboration of substantive law in two 
ways.  First, the existence of precedent as a frame of reference for the validity of 
statements about the law, combined with the procedural reforms discussed above, 
allowed appellate courts to establish and enforce adherence to legal doctrines over 
time.  On another level, the new data about the law allowed commentators (again led 
by Kent) to deduce the underlying structure and principles of the law and embody 
them in treatises.  In this process, authors like Kent and Story sought, like 
Blackstone, to reveal an internal consistency and core of essential principles that 
characterized a distinctly American body of law.79  This project, which was related to 
the English treatise tradition and also to the Continental tradition of institutes of 
national law,80 introduced a new level of abstraction to the discourse of American 
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law: While the individual state high courts could use the language of precedent to 
develop doctrinal consistency within their respective jurisdictions, the treatise writers 
took that same language in an attempt to identify (and foster) a set of principles that 
were valid across the various American jurisdictions.81 
The new abstraction, made possible by the generation of legal data in the form of 
collected case reports, had several effects that were functional within the milieu of 
early nineteenth-century thinking about the law.  First, it operated on a previously 
unknown level of generality, which promoted a way of thinking about the law that 
was detached from the specific circumstances of a given case and its political 
context.  This detachment allowed at least the appearance of a “neutral and apolitical 
system of legal doctrine and legal reasoning” that would allow the courts to function 
as a safeguard against the potential for tyranny by the democratic majority.82  The 
abstract discourse of law as science also allowed American legal thinkers (as it had 
Blackstone) to conceptualize the law as being divided into discrete doctrinal 
categories, each with their own internal policies and logic.83  This allowed for greater 
consistency within doctrinal categories, creating a stability and predictability that 
served the interests of merchants, and at the same time allowed for functional 
inconsistencies between doctrinal categories.84  Finally, the elaboration of an 
American legal science created a new field of activity for the American bar, giving it 
a claim to intellectual rigor that helped raise its prestige in the eyes of the American 
public and justify its privileges.85 
The new American legal science was able to become the dominant ideology of 
the law in the first decades of the nineteenth century because it answered demands 
for change—for the separation of law and politics, for a more stable and predictable 
body of law, for the advancement of the legal profession—that various segments of 
American society were making at the time.  It provided the alternative conceptual 
framework that was necessary in order to marginalize the jury as finder of law, a step 
which was necessary to realize each of these larger goals.  It achieved longevity at 
least in part because it concerned itself (echoing Blackstone once more) with the 
formal education of lawyers, a process that oriented each student to the philosophy 
and methodology of law as science and gave him a personal stake in the maintenance 
of the system.  The new system of legal education ensured that future generations of 
lawyers would understand that “the laws of a given society [were] not the arbitrary 
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determinations . . . of people, but an expression of a ‘permanent, uniform and 
universal’ code.”86   
The purpose of this part has been to show that, in the course of a few decades, 
roughly coterminous with the period of James Kent’s career between his 
appointment to the New York Supreme Court in 1798 and the publication of his 
Commentaries in 1826, Kent and others brought forth an ideology of law as a science 
that, due to a constellation of social factors, became the dominant way of 
conceptualizing the law in America.  It has been written that the new legal ideology 
needed to marginalize the jury in order to achieve its goals.87  It seems equally likely 
that those in American society who already wanted to marginalize the jury needed 
legal science in order to do so, as it could provide an alternative to the law-finding 
jury that vested power in judges while allowing the process of finding the law to 
appear both apolitical and non-arbitrary.  In either case, it appears that absent the rise 
of the system of thought I have been calling American legal science, the demise of 
the law-finding jury would not have occurred as swiftly or as thoroughly as it did.     
Law as science did have its costs, though they were largely born by the jury—
that unstable and inchoate “body” with no permanent members and no real voice 
within the legal establishment—and the lay public at large.  The ideology of 
American legal science included an epistemology of the law—law just as knowable 
through study of precedents and learned treatises—that drew rigid new boundaries 
for the discursive community of the law.  No longer were the principles of the law 
“drawn in and imbibed with the Nurses Milk and first Air,” as John Adams had 
argued,88 imparted to each man simply by virtue of his membership in an ethical 
community.  Nor was the jury box any longer a space in which the law of the 
lawyers had to justify itself in the eyes of the community through its proxy the jury, a 
space of ethical action in which lay people had the power and the right to determine 
the rules of decision in a given case.  In a few short decades the law-finding power of 
the jury was curtailed, the law as it was applied in the courtroom was transformed 
from a bastion of popular power into an elite discourse for lawyers and judges, and 
the people found themselves more fully out of doors. 
II. 
Law as science made quite a career for itself in nineteenth-century America, not 
only because it provided a basis for bold line-drawing around the borders of the 
legitimate legal discursive community, but also because it allowed law and legal 
decision-making to be founded on something other than the personal political 
preferences of lawyers and judges.  When proponents of legal codification asserted 
that the common law put excessive power in the hands of judges to exercise political 
lawmaking power that belonged in the hands of representative bodies,89 law as 
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science provided a counterargument: that judges merely declared the law that they 
discovered through their research and reasoning.90  Similarly, law as a science that 
was insulated from politics and the will of judges became an important part of the 
legal establishment’s response to slavery—the paradigmatic legal and political issue 
of the nineteenth century.   
Prior to the Civil War, Northern judges with anti-slavery leanings drew upon the 
strict line dividing law and politics to disclaim their personal responsibility for the 
maintenance of the slavery system by adopting a self-abnegating stance in relation to 
the “science” of the law—what Robert Cover termed “the judicial can’t.”91  Justice 
Taney’s decision in the Dred Scott case,92 widely perceived at the time (at least in the 
North) as a piece of partisan political hackery, brought the Supreme Court’s popular 
support to a nadir not seen before or since.93 After the Civil War, therefore, scholars 
and judges sought to “establish a non-political oasis through law” by continuing and 
refining the discourse of law as a formal science, a movement that culminated in the 
later nineteenth century in what Morton Horwitz called the system of “Classical 
Legal Thought.”94 
 Several generations of scholars have spent nearly a century exposing, attacking, 
and debunking the rhetorical and philosophical underpinnings of Classical Legal 
Thought—the public-private distinction, the neutral state, and the conception of law 
as an apolitical science, among others—with such success that no one really disputes 
Joseph William Singer’s assertion that “[w]e are all legal realists now.”95  Yet the 
division of power in the courtroom between judge and jury, which I have argued is 
an artifact of the same (or at least closely related) historical idea of law as science, 
has gone largely unchallenged.  It is true that the mid-1990s, controversies 
surrounding the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson cases provoked some scholarly 
discussion of “jury nullification,” the essentially negative power of a jury to refuse to 
apply a law in certain marginal situations involving laws that are unjust, either in the 
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abstract or as applied to a specific individual.96  But the power, or even the right, to 
nullify a law by refusing to apply it in specific extreme circumstances amounts to 
little more than a veto and seems miniscule in comparison to the breadth and depth 
of the positive, law-generating power of the early American jury.   
The recent interest in popular constitutionalism and the arguments surrounding it, 
both historical and normative, have raised important questions about the possibility 
and desirability of broader popular participation in the generation and interpretation 
of legal norms.  It seems only logical that the role of the jury should become part of 
this debate, both because of the historical role of the jury as a law-finding institution 
and because it continues to be an institution that brings lay people in contact with the 
law on a daily basis.  Can the law-finding jury be restored as a means of increasing 
popular participation in, and identification with, the legal order?  I believe that this is 
a real issue to be confronted today by the academy, the courts, and society at large.  
It is not obvious what the answer should be, but it is obvious that those who would 
argue for maintaining the current order can no longer rely on the nineteenth-century 
ideology of law as science for justification, nor can they point to its naturalness, 
inevitability, or unbroken historical continuity. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a systematic exploration of the 
costs and benefits for today’s society of a system in which juries have the authority 
to determine the legal rules that they will apply to the cases they decide.  The very 
asking of the question challenges us to entertain a new paradigm for thinking about 
law, society, and the very process of adjudication.  In turn, the foundation of a new 
paradigm may require a different set of justifications than those that are customarily 
advanced within the normal legal discourse.  In short, the question confronts our 
legal ideology as it is manifested in our actual legal practices with a crisis that 
reaches down to the level of basic concepts.  The conflict between alternative modes 
of legality is particularly apparent along several axes which I outline briefly in the 
following pages.  
A.  Abstract Rule-Based Adjudication vs. Justice in Individual Applications 
As discussed above, one of the original motivations and justifications for 
curtailing the power of the jury to decide questions of law was a desire for greater 
certainty and consistency in the application of law.  This has continued to be a 
concern in the context of more recent discussions on the topic of jury nullification: 
Critics of expanding or legitimizing the law-finding power of the jury see 
independent juror action as frustrating the interests of citizen and legislator alike in 
uniform and predictable application of the laws.97  This view reflects the preference 
of the legal profession and society in general for rule-based, categorical reasoning—
what Antonin Scalia famously described as “The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules”98—in which logical reasoning that proceeds inexorably from abstract 
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principles to specific application is seen as the sine qua non of a rational and 
legitimate order.  Viewed in this light, the nullifying jury, and a fortiori the law-
finding jury, introduces a dangerous and unpredictable variable into the algorithm of 
justice. 
Despite its centrality in our legal culture and our society in general, this 
insistence on rule-based decision making, with its prioritization of the abstract over 
the specific and syllogistic reasoning over more flexible case-by-case approaches is 
neither “natural” nor inevitable.  For example, Carol Gilligan’s work in the field of 
cultural feminism suggests that the preference for rule-based logic (which she 
characterizes as “male”) and the deprecation of reasoning that looks to the justice or 
fairness of specific applications (which she sees as “female”) is a product of  societal 
gender bias.99  While it is disputed that either mode of reasoning is characteristically 
male or female as an empirical matter, it is clear that alternative modes of reasoning 
exist and that none can claim a priori to be superior to another.  What the law-
finding jury may “cost” society in terms of a loss of certainty and uniformity can also 
be viewed as a gain in its ability to tailor legal rules to achieve justice in specific 
applications by taking into account the individuals and relationships involved.100  A 
full-fledged debate on the merits of the jury as finder of law, therefore, would need 
to address the merits of our longstanding commitment to abstract, rule-based 
reasoning as the exclusive legitimate mode of legal reasoning and adjudication. 
B.  The Jury as an Adjunct of the Court vs. the Jury as a “Branch” of Government 
The conventional separation of powers in the courtroom between judge and jury 
makes the jury a fact-finding adjunct of the court, performing an essentially 
“mechanical operation” on the data of the case: first, determining the true facts, and 
secondly, applying the law as given by the court to those facts.101  Even a more 
liberal interpretation of the role of the jury, such as Nancy Marder’s “process view,” 
which recognizes that juries perform an interpretive function and may even engage 
in “lawmaking,” seems to view such interpretation and “lawmaking” more as an 
unavoidable necessity in the jury’s performance of its proper role—for instance, 
when a legal standard is vague, or when mixed questions of law and fact are 
present—than as a desirable practice.102  The jury’s duty to take the law as it is given 
by the court, reserving its contributions to interstitial gap-filling, is generally seen as 
a requirement of our commitment to democratic norms and political processes.  
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Citizens who disagree with a bad law can express their displeasure with publicly-
accountable legislators at the polls, but jurors are a fleeting body who cannot 
similarly be held accountable.  Consequently, most commentators are “skeptical that 
the jury is really an appropriate forum for democratic deliberation about the justice 
of duly enacted laws.”103 
It is not obvious why law-finding by juries necessarily presents a threat to 
democratic norms, nor is it obvious that, to the extent it threatens norms that could be 
called “democratic,” we should necessarily consider this a bad thing.  It seems safe 
to assume most laws enacted by elected bodies reflect the will of a majority of their 
constituents and would find support among a representative jury chosen by the same 
group.  And if a law enacted by a representative legislature is not followed by a 
representative jury, it is not clear that we should assume that the jury, in making its 
decision, rather than the legislature in enacting the law, failed to translate the will of 
the community into effective law.  A properly representative law-finding jury could 
be conceptualized as a fourth branch of the government, performing an error-
correction function when laws generated by the legislature fail (for whatever reason) 
to reflect the norms of the community, either in the abstract or in a specific 
application. 
There is one feature of democracy as it is currently practiced in the United States 
that would likely be challenged by a system of jury nullification.  Because the 
structure of jury decision-making requires a supermajority or unanimous result, a 
greater consensus is required in the jury room than in the pure majoritarian, winner-
take-all paradigm of democracy that characterizes most of our elections and 
legislative votes.  Consequently, legislation that has a bare majority support in the 
community and the legislature could be expected to have a high failure rate in the 
crucible of the jury room.  While this would arguably be a frustration of “pure” 
democracy, it could also have positive effects.  First, it would increase the incentive 
for broad-based initiatives and dialogue across various constituencies—in short, 
consensus-building.  Second, it would reduce incentives to gerrymander in order to 
produce slight numerical majorities within jurisdictions.  Third, to the extent that 
certain groups—possibly as a result of systematic historical oppression that may or 
may not continue today—are better represented in the jury pool than the polling 
places, the law-finding jury would increase their overall input into the effective law-
making process. 
Because the jury as finder of law is so problematic from the standpoint of 
democratic norms—or more accurately, from the standpoint of the specific practices 
that we consider to be constitutive of democracy today—a true debate of its merits 
would require a reevaluation of our commitment to current democratic practices and 
a weighing of alternative modes of democratic governance. 
C.  Interests Beyond the Adjudication of Specific Cases 
If the jury system is seen as entirely or predominantly existing for the purpose of 
reaching a just, fair, or accurate adjudication of cases that come to court, it is easier 
to argue against the recognition of a law-finding power in the jury.  Courts and 
commentators since Justice Story in Battiste have linked the duty of the jury to 
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follow the law as given by the court to the interests not only of the institutions of 
government whose interests are intruded on by a law-finding or nullifying jury and 
of society at large in having predictable, uniform rules, but also to the interests of the 
parties to a given case.104  Strong arguments exist, as discussed above, that the 
legislature’s interest in having its laws become effective, society’s interest in 
uniform and predictable laws, and the interests of the parties in a fair and accurate 
adjudication are best served by the jury’s confinement to its conventional fact-
finding role. 
Conspicuously absent in this interest inventory is the juror.  Does the juror have 
an interest in being part of a law-finding jury?  Does the government, or society in 
general, have an interest in the juror being vested with law-finding authority?  By 
admitting the juror to the discursive community of the law, we might recognize and 
nurture his or her capacity for high-order thought, for argument, for understanding 
and developing him or herself as a meaningful part of a community with agency and 
power, while at the same time creating an incentive for society to prepare its citizens 
through education and other means to take on such a role in the future.  By 
recognizing not only the reality or necessity, but also the legitimacy of jurors’ 
choices, we would affirm their status as ethical subjects.  Jury service would then not 
merely be a duty owed by the citizens to the state, but an exercise of state power by 
citizena that could test and develop them as an individuals: an ethopoetic exercise, 
meaning one that is capable of changing and building the active subject’s ethos, their 
way of bringing the truths they know to bear on the world around them, alternatively 
described as their mode of existence.105 
CONCLUSION 
The law-finding jury, and the idea of the law to which it corresponded in its time, 
represent an important—if little appreciated—aspect of historical American legal 
ideology.  At the same time, the marginalization of the jury as a law-finding 
institution is a significant set piece of American legal history, in which an earlier 
consensus-based, organic conception of the law was displaced within the span of a 
few decades by an ideology of law as an apolitical legal science.  Historicizing our 
current jury practices and recognizing the existence of alternative practices and 
ideologies removes the façade of naturalness and inevitability from the current 
division of powers between judge and jury in the courtroom, a system that is so 
deeply ingrained in our thought and practice today as to be virtually unquestioned.  
Unless we wish to accept this system and its consequences uncritically, allowing it to 
survive solely by virtue of the inertia of tradition, I believe we must commit to 
debate it more fully, recognizing its contingency, and justify it on new practical or 
ideological grounds or abandon it for another system more consistent with 
contemporary legal norms.   
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The possibilities—in theory and in practice—are endless.  The resolution of this 
crisis in our legal science is—when we appreciate, with reference to legal history, the 
contingent nature of any regime—markedly underdetermined.  Does an individual 
citizen have an interest that we are willing to recognize in having such an experience 
when called as a juror?  Does a government or society at large have a cognizable 
interest in the development of citizens as ethical subjects through mechanisms such 
as jury service?  A true debate about the merits of the law-finding jury will 
necessitate a reexamination of the interests served by jury trials, the extent to which 
our legal system should take into account jurors’ interest in self-realization, and the 
extent to which we perceive government as having an interest in promoting the 
fullest possible development of its citizens.  Once we are aware of the historical 
genesis of the current system, we can no longer ignore the power relationships and 
ideological commitments embedded within it and avoid ethical responsibility for 
reproducing them.  Thus, historical self-consciousness creates both a power and an 
ethical duty in us; only time will tell if we are prepared to answer the challenge. 
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